Chapter Three

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GUERRILLAS
Colombia's physical and socio-political landscape-a territory fragmented by mountain ranges and tropical forests, deficient infrastructure, lack of national integration, and the tradition of armed revolts against the central authorities-has provided fertile ground for guerrillas. Guerrilla warfare shading into politicized banditry has been, in fact, the most prevalent form of armed activity in the country's civil conflicts since colonial times.
The patterns of Colombia's current armed conflict were set in the period of widespread political violence appropriately known as la violencia. La violencia began after the assassination of Liberal Party leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán on April 9, 1948, and intensified after a Conservative victory in 1949, in an election that the Liberal Party boycotted. In the years that followed, the Liberal and Conservative parties mobilized armed supporters in the countryside in an undeclared civil war that claimed over 200,000 lives.
THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA (FARC)
The major guerrilla organization, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), is part of this tradition. The FARC leader, Manuel Marulanda Vélez, better known as Tirofijo ("Sureshot"), began his guerrilla career in 1949 when he joined a Liberal guerrilla band in the department of Tolima, an epicenter of the violence. 1 In 1964, Maru-______________ 1 Marulanda was born Pedro Antonio Marín in Quindío in 1930; he changed his name to Manuel Marulanda in honor of a union leader of the same name killed by the security forces. See "El viejo guerrillero y su delfín," El Mundo (Madrid), July 11, 1998. landa helped to establish a Communist-oriented "independent republic" in Marquetalia, a remote area in southern Tolima. It was one of several "republics" established by Communist-oriented guerrillas in southern Colombia. 2 Marulanda escaped when the Colombian army attacked and destroyed the Marquetalia guerrilla group in June 1964. In 1966, the Communist guerrillas, denominated "Communist self-defense forces," were reorganized as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), with Marulanda as Chief of Staff.
The FARC expanded slowly between the mid-1960s and the 1980s. In its early stages, FARC guerrillas engaged in ambushes of military units and raids on farms. The main objectives were capturing military equipment, securing food and supplies, capturing hostages, and settling scores with informers. Those activities were restricted to the areas where the guerrillas had historically operated. Far from attacking the "nerve centers of the country," as the FARC manifesto of May 1966 asserted, the FARC was more concerned with survival in the face of a determined effort by the Colombian army to eliminate it. In this formative period, the FARC began to take on the accoutrements of an army by wearing uniforms and insignia and establishing a code with severe punishments for banditry, crimes of passion, and informing. 3 In 1969, the FARC opened a second guerrilla front in the middle Magdalena valley, in an inhospitable but strategic area on the border between the departments of Boyacá and Santander. In 1971, it established a third front in the Urabá area, in the Darien gap between Panama and Colombia. In 1974, the organization established a general staff and a secretariat to provide political direction. In the 1980s, the FARC began to implement the expansion strategy set at its 1982 Seventh Conference. Each existing front was to grow another front, ______________ 2 Others were established in Rio Chiquito, El Pato-Guayabero, and Santa Barbara.
They were eradicated by the Colombian army in counter-insurgency campaigns from 1963 to 1966 . 3 Richard Maullin, Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia, RAND, R-0630-ARPA, 1971 until there was at least one for each of Colombia's fifty-odd departments. 4 A front is not a military unit of any particular size; it refers to a guerrilla command operating in a geographic jurisdiction. Within the front jurisdiction there are combat, support, and infrastructure elements. Usually the core of the front is the combat units, generally one or several companies. A column consists of two or more companies. A company consists of some 50-55 fighters, divided into two platoons called guerrillas, each consisting of approximately 25 fighters. Platoons are further subdivided into squads of seven or eight fighters. Besides the combat units there are commissions, staffed by militia members. The finance commission is in charge of collecting "taxes." In addition, there are logistics commissions, intelligence commissions, public order commissions, mass work commissions, and others as may be designated by the front commander. 5 The FARC grew in the 1980s by tapping into revenues obtained by exploiting primary commodities-a phenomenon identified in recent World Bank studies to explain the growth of rebel movements in several developing countries. 6 The FARC took advantage of a ceasefire with the government of President Belisario Betancur from 1984 to 1987 to expand and consolidate its operations in resource-rich areas (cattle in the eastern plains, commercial agriculture in Urabá and Santander, oil in the middle Magdalena valley, and gold in Antioquia). Three new fronts were established in Caquetá and Meta, the departments east of the easternmost range of the Andes, which are now the source of much of Colombia's coca crop, and two more ______________ 4 Departments are the political divisions into which the country is divided (there is also a Special District covering the capital, Bogotá). Departments are divided in turn into municipios (urban areas) and corregimientos (rural areas). were established in the middle Magdalena valley. 7 The FARC also derived income from smuggling in the border regions. 8 At this time the FARC began to develop linkages with the illegal drug industry, whose production facilities were located largely in the areas into which the guerrillas were expanding their operations. How this linkage came about may have a bearing on the dynamics of the current triangular government-guerrilla-paramilitary struggle. The policy of taxing the drug industry and mobilizing and recruiting people in the lower end of the drug business was laid out formally in the unpublished "Conclusions" of the FARC Seventh Conference. 9 According to a political leader in Guaviare, until 1981 the insurgents in that area forbade the cultivation of coca and marijuana, which they considered counter-revolutionary. At that time drug traffickers, protected by paramilitaries, began to move into the region, and coca cultivation developed into the dominant economic activity. Fearing the loss of their social base-agricultural migrants-to their political enemies, the guerrillas began to promote and protect the coca crop themselves. 10 In the 1990s, FARC fronts proliferated in the coca-growing regions east of the Andes-nine new fronts were active in the department of Meta alone. New fronts were also established closer to the country's population centers and economically strategic regions, including five new fronts in Cundinamarca, the department closest to the capital, Bogotá.
The FARC grew from 350 fighters at its founding in 1966 to approximately 3600 in 32 fronts in 1986, 7000 in 60 fronts in 1995, and 15,000-20,000 in over 70 fronts in 2000. 11 The long-term goal was the creation of a force of 30,000, which in the FARC's estimation would enable the organization to engage in large-scale offensive operations against the main units of the Colombian army. 12 The FARC is organized into seven territorial "blocs," each composed of four to five fronts in the smaller blocs to 15 to 20 in the larger ones (see Figure 3 .1). Each front in turn is composed of columns of up to a hundred fighters. The seven FARC blocs are 1. The eastern bloc, with 21 fronts, covers the region east of the eastern cordillera of the Andes and the central departments of Cundinamarca and Boyacá. Its strategic task is to cut off the populous central highlands from the eastern plains and the Amazonian region.
2. The northwestern bloc, with eight fronts, operates in the departments of Antioquia, Chocó, and Córdoba. This bloc controls a corridor from the Panamanian border and the adjacent Atlantic and Pacific coasts to the middle Magdalena valley.
3. The middle Magdalena bloc is active in the area of the same name. Its units operate in parts of the departments of Antioquia, Bolívar, Cesar, Santander, and Boyacá.
4. The southern bloc covers the FARC's strongholds in southern Colombia, in the departments of Caquetá, Huila, Putumayo, and part of Cauca. This area also includes most of the "demilitarized zone" conceded to the FARC by the Colombian government.
5. The western (or southwestern) bloc operates in the departments of Nariño, Cauca, and Valle, the region from the western cordillera of the Andes to the Pacific Ocean and down to the Ecuadorean border. 7. The northern (or Caribbean) bloc, which also has registered a relatively low level of activity, operates in the Atlantic coast departments and on the Venezuelan border. 13 In addition, there are 15 independent companies (equivalent to fronts) assigned to the different blocs and used as a reserve by the bloc commander. There are also mobile columns under the direct control of the FARC secretariat. These independent companies and mobile columns are given names (usually of historical figures or revolutionary heroes) rather than numbers. 14 Despite the FARC's ability to expand its military forces and the areas where they operate, the organization has some critical weaknesses, notably its linkage to criminal elements and its lack of support among the population at large. Opinion polls estimate overall FARC support at about 5 percent of the population. Although the FARC has some support in the urban areas, its presence in the cities is limited. 15 In the areas where it predominates, the FARC has endeavored to institutionalize popular support by setting up political support groups, but in fact it enforces its rule largely through selective terror and intimidation. That said, the Bogotá authorities have not been successful in turning the lack of popular support for the guerrillas into active support for the government. 16 Local opposition to the guerrillas has developed spontaneously, largely outside of government control, in the form of the illegal self-defense forces, commonly known as paramilitaries. 
THE NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (ELN)
Adherents of Cuban-style revolution founded the National Liberation Army (ELN 
SOURCES OF GUERRILLA INCOME: LINKS TO THE DRUG TRADE
Recent research has sought to establish a tie between civil conflict and the ability of rebel groups to derive income from commodities. 22 Colombia is a classic case of guerrilla organizations that are able to capture enough resources to support the growth of their military forces. According to Colombian government figures, in 1998 the various illegal organizations (guerrillas and paramilitaries) derived 620 billion pesos ($551 million) from the drug traffic, 350 billion pesos ($311 million) from extortion, and 265.5 billion pesos ($236 million) from kidnappings. 23 According to Colombian analysts, the FARC and the ELN together account for 20 to 30 percent of all of the kidnappings that take place in the world. 24 As shown in In contrast to the FARC, the ELN manifested some reluctance to exploit the resources of the illegal drug trade. According to Colombian government figures, only one sixth of the ELN fronts are linked to the drug trade (see Table 3 .1). However, after el cura Pérez' death, those who argue for a more "pragmatic" approach to drugs appear to be gaining ground within the ELN. 26 Some Colombian analysts believe that although hard evidence is lacking it would be prudent to assume that the guerrillas have saved a substantial part of their income as a strategic financial reserve that would be available to sustain an escalation of the conflict. 27 In any event, the development of these sources of funding has broadened the range of strategic options available to the guerrillas.
OTHER SOURCES OF GUERRILLA INCOME
Before the development of the linkages between the guerrilla groups and the drug trade in the 1980s, the guerrillas derived most of their income from kidnappings and "revolutionary taxes," a thinly disguised form of extortion. 28 27 Rangel, p. 31.
28 Or, as Spencer points out, not so thinly disguised, since the consequences of not paying are death, destruction of property, or kidnapping for ransom. Spencer also people were being held for ransom, mostly by the guerrilla groups. Some 1559 people were kidnapped, including 126 children, in the first six months of 2000 alone. 29 A statistical survey of kidnappings in the 1987-1997 period shows that most of the kidnappings occurred in the agricultural and cattle-raising areas in the eastern part of the country and that the majority of the victims were cattle ranchers, farmers, and merchants, but the threat is very much felt in the cities, prompting an exodus of professional and business people. It is estimated that from 1991 to 1996 the guerrilla groups derived 788 billion pesos, or 22 percent of their total income, from kidnappings. 30 Kidnappings are also used for propaganda purposes and to intimidate political and civil leaders. In some cases, the victims are highprofile individuals, including members of the Colombian Congress and former ministers. 31 Lower-level officials, especially mayors and municipal council members, are particularly vulnerable to kidnapping and the threat of kidnapping, assassination, and other intimidation tactics. Guerrillas and illegal self-defense groups avail themselves of these tactics to gain control of local governments and tap into revenues available to local authorities as the result of decentralization reform in the 1980s and 1990s. As discussed in the following chapter, as the guerrillas or illegal self-defense forces gain control of towns and rural areas, they also gain control of local government payrolls, infrastructure funds, and other sources of income. 32 _____________________________________________________________ points out that kidnappings and extortion serve as a means of political control. 
THE ARMS PIPELINE
These resources have enabled the guerrillas-primarily the FARC-to develop an arms pipeline that delivers assault rifles; heavy machine guns; 60mm, 81mm, and 82mm mortars; rocket-propelled grenades; and other military equipment, spare parts, and ammunition. The guerrillas are believed to possess shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles, although they have not been used to date, and have reportedly upgraded their communications with Japanese and European encryption technology and voice scramblers. 33
Central America was and remains a major source of the weapons smuggled into Colombia (see There has also been an inflow of weapons from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, possibly as the result of linkages between Colombian drug smugglers and guerrillas and Russian criminal syndicates. A shipment of 10,000 AK-47 assault rifles was air-dropped into FARC-controlled territory in eastern Colombia from chartered cargo planes that were supposedly transporting the rifles to Peru from Jordan. (It subsequently was alleged that the then-powerful chief of the Peruvian National Intelligence Service, Vladimiro Montesinos, had masterminded the transaction.) 38
SUPPORTING NETWORKS AND INFORMATION-AGE WARFARE
The guerrillas draw political strength and sustenance from a robust network of supporting organizations, both in Colombia and overseas. Multiorganizational networks aided the insurgencies in El Salvador and Guatemala and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in the 1980s, but have assumed a larger role with the information revolution of the 1990s and particularly with the development of the Internet. Control of the "zona de despeje" or demilitarized zone has amplified the FARC's ability to conduct such information operations. The FARC has held a series of public conferences on social and economic problems with representatives of labor, business, and civil society organizations in San Vicente del Caguán. These conferences and visits by international dignitaries, such as New York Stock Exchange Chairman Grasso, were widely reported in the Colombian and international media and helped the FARC to publicize its demands, criticize the government, and engage influential audiences.
The FARC scored a significant political victory at the end of June 2000 when diplomats from Europe, Canada, Japan, and the United Nations traveled to the FARC-controlled zone to discuss crop eradication and human rights with FARC leaders. The visit underscored the differences between the U.S. and European approaches to the Colombian crisis (discussed in Chapter Six). After the discussions, the diplomats attended a forum with several hundred small farmers from the area who denounced the U.S. and Colombian government counter-narcotics policies. 41 Activities such as these enhance the guerrillas' perceived legitimacy, diminish the stature of the government in Bogotá, and complicate the Colombian government's ability to secure international support. As will be seen in the following chapter, this is part of an integrated FARC strategy to increase its leverage and influence over Colombia's future.
______________ 40 E-mail, "Pen letter to the countries of the group of support for peace in Colombia."
